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Araas: Indian Law - Water Law - Transferability of Reserved Rights from

CASE NOTES
INDIAN LAW-WATER LAW- Transferability of Reserved Rights from the
Indian Allottee to the Non-indian Purchaser: Are the purposes of the reservation and the interests of the tribe really served? Colville Confederated
Tribes v. Walton, 647 F.2d 42 (9th Cir. 1981), petition for cert. filed, 50
U.S.L.W. 3133 (U.S. Aug. 18, 1981) (No. 81-321).

On July 2, 1872, the Colville Indian Reservation was
established by executive order' as the homeland for the Colville Confederated tribes.2 The Reservation, located in a mountainous, semi-arid region of north central Washington, completely encompasses No Name Creek within its exterior boundaries. No Name Creek is a small, non-navigable stream that
arises from springs located on, and immediately adjacent to,
the northern portion of lands which are held in fee by defendants Boyd Walton, Jr., his wife, Kenna Jeanne Walton and
Wilson Walton and Margaret Walton, his wife. 3 The creek
flows southerly across the Waltons' land, allotted Indian land
4
and tribal lands before it enters Omak Lake.
In 1906, Congress ratified an agreement with the tribe
providing for the distribution of reservation lands to individual
tribal members pursuant to the General Allotment Act of
18871 and for disposition of the remainder by entry and settlement.6 In 1917, a line of seven allotments was created in the
No Name Creek watershed. The middle three allotments are
owned by Walton, a non-Indian. These lands were not irrigated
by the original Indian allottee. However, in 1946, this land was
Copyright@ 1982 by the University of Wyoming.
1. Exec. Order of July 2, 1872, reprinted in KAPPLER, 1 INDIAN AFFAIRS: LAWS AND
TREATIES 915-16 (1904).
2. Hereinafter they will be referred to as the Tribe or the Colvilles.
3. Hereinafter they will be referred to as Walton.
4. Colville Confederated Tribes v. Walton, 460 F. Supp. 1320, 1334 (E.D. Wash. 1978).
5. The purpose of this Act was to provide for the allotment of lands in severalty to Indians
on the various reservations and to extend the protection of the laws of the United States
and the Territories over the Indians, and for other purposes. The General Allotment Act
of 1887, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388 (current version at 25 U.S.C. SS 331-334, 348, 349, 381
(1976)). The Act provides for assignment of tribal lands to tribal members in parcels of a
limited size. 25 U.S.C. S 331 (1976). Furthermore, the allottees are issued patents with
the title to be held in trust by the United States for a twenty-five year period. During this
period the land could not be encumbered or alienated. This period could be extended by
the President in his discretion if he deems it advisable. After the twenty-five year period
expired, the United States could convey the land by patent to the individual Indian in fee,
discharged of the trust and free of all encumbrances. 25 U.S.C. S 348 (1976).
In 1934, Congress enacted the Indian Reorganization Act which provided for the
discontinuance of allotments for tribes that adopted the system of government set forth
in the Act. 25 U.S.C. SS461, 478 (1976). Additionally, the trust periods and the restrictions on alienation were extended indefinitely. 25 U.S.C. S 462 (1976). However, the Colvilles did not organize under the Indian Reorganization Act. MAXFIELD, NATURAL
RESOURCES LAw ON AMERICAN INDIAN LANDS 318 (1977). [Hereinafter cited as MAXFIELD).

6. Act of March 22, 1906, 34 Stat. 80, 81. This agreement was effectuated by a Presidential
proclamation in 1916. 39 Stat. 1778 (1916).
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sold to another Indian 7 who, in 1948 when Walton purchased
the land, was irrigating approximately thirty-two acres.
Walton now irrigates 102 acres and uses additional water for
domestic and stock watering purposes.s The Walton land is
bordered on the north and south by allotments held in trust by
the United States for the Colville Indians.
The Tribe brought suit in 1970 to enjoin Walton from using
No Name Creek waters, claiming that the Tribe's reserved
water rights were superior to Walton's rights. The Colvilles
also claimed that there was an insufficient amount of water to
satisfy both parties' needs.9 Walton claims to have succeeded
to a reserved right from the Indian allottees to irrigate all of
their irrigable acreage or, alternatively, to a right to irrigate at
least the thirty-two acres that were under irrigation at the
time of the conveyance. 10 The district court held that an Indian
allottee may not transfer his implied reserved water rights to a
non-Indian. 1 Consequently, the court found that Walton succeeded to the water right to irrigate the thirty-two acres under
irrigation at the time of acquisition, with a priority date of actual appropriation of water for that use. 12
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the decision
of the district court by holding that an Indian allottee may
transfer the "full" amount of his reserved water rights to a
non-Indian purchaser. 3 Consequently, the non-Indian purchaser acquires the Indian allottee's priority date. In addition,
the non-Indian receives the amount of water appropriated by
the Indian at the time of the conveyance and that amount of
water that he, the non-Indian, appropriates with reasonable
diligence after the passage of title. 14 This note will focus on the
ability of an Indian allottee to transfer his reserved water
rights to a non-Indian purchaser and on the detrimental results
of such a transfer. 15
7. This second purchaser of the middle three allotments was not a member of the Colville
Tribes. Colville Confederated Tribes v. Walton, supra note 4, at 1324.
8. Id. at 1334,

9. Id. at 1323.
10. Id. at 1324.
11. Id. at 1328.
12. Id. at 1329.

13. Colville Confederated Tribes v. Walton, 647 F.2d 42, 51 (9th Cir. 1981) [hereinafter cited
in text as Colville].

14. Id.
15. An additional controversial holding by the court was that the state was without authority

to regulate water within the Reservation's boundaries. The fact that No Name Creek is a
non-navigable stream entirely within the Reservation's boundaries made this decision
somewhat easier for the court. Id. at 52.
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RESERVED WATER RIGHTS

To determine the respective water rights of the parties in
question, a brief history of the implied reserved water rights
doctrine is beneficial. In 1908, the Supreme Court in Winters
v. United States16 established the doctrine of implied reservation of water. The Winters doctrine provides that when the
United States reserves public domain for a federal purpose, including Indian reservations, there is an implied reservation of
appurtenant water needed to accomplish the purpose of the
reservation. 1 7 The Winters Court held that the reservation of

water rights was made on the date the reservation was
created. 18

This judicial doctrine has been amplified and refined by
several decisions since 1908. In United States v. Powers,'9 a
Supreme Court case relied upon by some courts to resolve
issues similar to the ones in the Colville case, the Court
cautiously addressed the question of transferability of reserved rights. The Powers Court concurred with the respondent
non-Indian purchasers that some portion of the right to use the
Tribe's waters passed to the purchaser.2 0 The Court did not,
however, "consider the extent or precise nature of
'2 1
respondent's [non-Indian purchaser's] rights in the waters."

The Supreme Court has not had the opportunity to address the
22
transferability issue since Powers.
2 3
In Arizona v. California,
the Supreme Court held that
reserved water rights for Indians can be set aside by executive

order as well as by treaty or Act of Congress. 2 4 Also, in adopt16. 207 U.S. 564 (1908) [hereinafter cited in text as Winters].
17. Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128, 138 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Cappaert].
18. Winters v. United States, supra note 16, at 577. See also Cappaert v. United States,
supra note 17; Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 600 (1963).
19. 305 U.S. 527 (1938) [hereinafter cited in text as Powers]. In Powers, the United States
sought to enjoin Thomas Powers, a non-Indian purchaser of allotted Indian lands, from
taking water from certain non-navigable streams within the Crow-Indian Reservation.
20. Id. at 532.
21. Id. at 533.
22. But see United States v. Ahtanum Irrigation District, 338 F.2d 307 (9th Cir. 1964);
Scheer v. Moody, 48 F.2d 327 (D. Mont. 1931).
23. Supra note 18 hereinafter cited in text as Arizona]. In Arizona, the basic controversy
was over the amount of water each state had a legal right to use from the navigable Colorado River and its tributaries.
24. Id. at 598. In Arizona, five Indian reservations, with the United States acting in their
behalf, asserted water rights in the mainstream of the Colorado River. One of those
reservations, the Colorado River Reservation, was created by Congressional Act. The
other four reservations were created by Executive Order. Id. at 596. See generally
Trelease, Indian Water Rights for MineralDevetopment, in MAXFIELD, supranote 5, at
217 [hereinafter cited as Trelease]; U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, FEDERAL INDIAN LAW

665 (1958).
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ing the ruling of the Special Master, the Arizona Court said,
"the water was intended to satisfy the future as well as the

present needs of the Indian Reservations."

25

Where the pur-

pose of the reservation's creation was to transform the Indians
into an agrarian people, these needs were determined to be
best quantified by measuring the reservation's "practicably
irrigable acreage.''26

In the most recent Supreme Court decision regarding

reserved water rights, United States v. New Mexico, 27 the
Court reemphasized that the water quantity reserved was that
needed to "fulfill the purpose of the reservation, no more. ' 28

This opinion stressed that federal reserved water rights exist
only for the "primary purposes" of the reservation, not for

"secondary uses" making water valuable. 29 Additionally,
within the language of the opinion, the Court recognized the

water needs of private and state appropriators and the necessity to consider those needs when determining a reserved rights
question.30
25. Arizona v. California, supra note 18, at 600. See United States v. Ahtanum Irrigation
District, supra note 22, at 327; Conrad Investment Co. v. United States, 161 F. 829, 832
(9th Cir. 1908).
26. Arizona v. California, supranote 18, at 600. The Court in Cappaert,however, determined
that the amount of water necessary to fulfill the purpose of the reservation was only the
amount to keep a surface water "pool" at the necessary level to preserve an endangered
fish species. Cappaert v. United States, supra note 17, at 141. In Cappaert,the dispute
centered around Devil's Hole, a deep cavern on federal land that was reserved as a national monument in 1952. The United States sought to enjoin the Cappaert's pumping of
irrigation groundwater which was from the same source as that supplying the Devil's
Hole "pool."
27. 438 U.S. 696 (1978) [hereinafter cited in the text as New Mexico]. In New Mexico, the
basic controversy was as to the amount of water the United States impliedly reserved
when it established the Gila National Forest in 1899.
28. Id. at 700 (citing Cappaert v. United States, supra note 17, at 141).
29. United States v. New Mexico, supra note 27, at 702. The New Mexico Court said:
Where water is necessary to fulfill the very purposes for which a federal reservation
was created, it is reasonable to conclude, even in the face of Congress' express
deference to state water law in other areas, that the United States intended to
reserve the necessary water. Where water is only valuable for a secondary use of the
reservation, however, there arises the contrary inference that Congress intended,
consistent with its other views, that the United States would acquire water in the
same manner as any other public or private appropriator. Id.
Even though the New Mexico decision specifically addressed reserved rights on national
forests, it does not seem presumptuous to assume that this reserved rights analysis applies to all federal reservations, including Indian reservations. The Supreme Court has
applied the reserved water rights doctrine to all types of land reserved for a federal purpose. Therefore, it should be a reasonable assumption that the New Mexico analysis applies to reserved rights on Indian reservations.
30. Id. at 705. The concern of the Court, in this regard, would be heightened when presented
with the question in Colville regarding the transferability of reserved rights from the Indian allottee to the non-Indian purchaser. The impact of allowing such a transfer in "full"
would be devastating to the needs of other public and private appropriators. This is
because of the special nature of the reserved right. The date-of-reservation priority date,
the open ended nature of the right (the lack of requirement for quantification of the right)
and the non-abandonment aspect of the right from non-use of the water would all allow
the non-Indian purchaser to "buy into" an appropriation senior and paramount to other
non-Indian appropriators. The ability of a non-Indian to do so would severely damage the
water needs of others governed by the doctrine of prior appropriation.
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Colville
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Colville applied the
facts of the case before it to the general rule "that termination
or diminution of Indian rights requires express legislation or a
clear inference of Congressional intent gleaned from the surrounding circumstances and legislative history. '3 1 The court
reasoned that restricting transferability of reserved water
rights by an Indian allottee to a non-Indian purchaser is a
" 'diminution of Indian rights' that must be supported by a
THE COURT'S ANALYSIS IN

clear inference of Congressional intent.

'3 2

The court, after

determining Congress' intent when enacting the General
Allotment Act of 1887, concluded that Congress did not intend
for transferability restrictions to survive the twenty-five year
trust period. 33 Therefore, the court held that the absence of a
clear Congressional intent to continue restrictions meant there
is "no basis for limiting the transferability of that right" to
34
share in reserved waters.

When determining the nature of the right acquired by
Walton, the court concluded that "the full quantity of water
available to the Indian allottee... may be conveyed to the nonIndian purchaser. ' 35 The court arrived at this decision by a
three-step rationale:
1) Just as the Indian's right is limited by the number of
irrigable acres he owns, so is the non-Indian's.
2) The Indian's priority date, as of the date the reservation was created, is the principal aspect making the
right more valuable than other water user's rights
and therefore is acquired by the non-Indian.
3) The non-Indian purchaser acquires a right to appropriated water at the time of conveyance. Additionally, he acquires a right, with a date-ofreservation priority date, to water appropriated by
him with reasonable diligence after the passage of
title. The non-Indian will lose the reserved water
right that he acquired if he
36 does not continually use
the full amount of water.
31. Colville Confederated Tribes v. Walton, supra note 13, at 50 (citing Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373, 392-93 (1975); Mattz v. Arnett, 412 U.S. 481, 504-05 (1972)).
32. Id. at 50.

33. Id.
34. Id.

35. Id. at 51.
36. Id.
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ANALYSIS OF THE COURT'S OPINION

Transferabilityof Reserved Rights
The decision arrived at in Colville seems to be contrary to
the rationale of the reserved rights doctrine and to the
established policy to protect Indian cultural interests. As the
New Mexico Court stated, "Where water is necessary to fulfill
the very purposes for which a federal reservation was created,
it is reasonable to conclude... that the United States intended
to reserve the necessary water." 3 7 As noted earlier, the New
Mexico Court went on to say that water was not reserved for
"secondary uses" of the reservation.38
Given its holding that the grant of reserved rights is
limited, the Court in New Mexico determined that the initial
purposes for creating national forests were carefully defined
by Congress in the Organic Administration Act of 1897. 39 A
contention presented by the United States that the Multiple
Use Sustained Yield Act of 196040 intended to expand the purposes of national forests and, thus, increase the amount of
reserved water was rejected by the Court. The Court felt that
to
these purposes expressed in the 1960 Act were secondary
41
Act.
1897
the
by
established
purposes
primary
the
Applying this rationale to the Colville facts, the "primary
purposes" for the creation of the Reservation are to be derived42
from the executive order establishing it. The Colville court
determined that a liberal construction 43 of the executive order
demonstrates that the purposes for creating the Reservation
were 1) to provide the Indians with a homeland to maintain
their agrarian society, and 2) to preserve the Tribe's access to
fishing grounds. 44 The inference by the Colville court that Con37. United States v. New Mexico, supra note 27, at 702. For full quotation see note 29 supra.
38. Id.

39. 16 U.S.C. S§ 473-475, 477-482 (1976). The purposes included in this Act were to 1) secure
favorable water flows, and 2) furnish continuous supply of timber. 16 U.S.C. S 475 (1976).
40. 16 U.S.C. SS 528-531 (1976). This Act expanded the purposes for which national forests
were established to include outdoor recreation, range, timber, watershed, and wildlife
and fish management. 16 U.S.C. S 528 (1976).

41. United States v. New Mexico, supra note 27, at 708.
42. Rather than a question of fact, it is a question of law when determining the government's

intention for establishing a federal reservation. Therefore, the appellate court can make
this determination. Trelease, supra note 24, at 219.

43. The rule of liberal construction, that agreements or treaties entered into with the Indians
shall be read in favor of the Indians, applies to executive orders creating reservations.
Colville Confederated Tribes v. Walton, supra note 13, at 47 n.9 (citing United States v.
Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 381 (1905)).
44. Colville Confederated Tribes v. Walton, supra note 13, at 47-48.
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gress intended, in the General Allotment Act, to allow for the
transfer of allotted lands, and also, the reserved water rights
appurtenant to those lands, would be analogous to extending
reserved water rights to "secondary uses" provided for by45the
Multiple Use Sustained Yield Act of 1960 in New Mexico.
Under the Colville facts, to allow the Indian allottee to
transfer his reserved water rights to Walton in full would not
serve to meet the primary purposes for the reservation of
those rights. Walton's purpose for use of the water is to sustain his own agricultural livelihood, not to satisfy the Colville's
need for a homeland and fishery. Therefore, the primary purposes for reservation of the water rights would be lost upon
transfer to Walton, a non-Indian. Thus, "when the purpose
'46
fails, the right should fail."

This is not to say that the transfer of reserved water rights
from an Indian allottee to a non-Indian purchaser can never
fulfill the purposes for creation of the reservation. There has
been a suggestion that an Indian allottee may need to transfer
some of his land to gather enough capital to practicably irrigate
his remaining land.4 7 Also, an Indian allottee may sell his land
to a private educational institution that was developed to teach
Indians agricultural practices. 48 Therefore, if the transfer of
land would be consistent with the primary purposes of reservation creation, the non-Indian should be able to receive some
portion of the reserved water rights.
A further concern to consider when addressing the
transferability issue is whether the Colville decision would be
an advancement of tribal interests. The General Allotment Act
45. See Dufford, Water For Non-Indians on the Reservation: CheckerboardOwnership and
CheckerboardJurisdiction,15 GONZ. L. REV. 95, 118 (1979). Professor Dufford feels that
inferring from the General Allotment Act that Congress intended to allow Indians to

transfer reserved water rights to non-Indians, as Colville did, is not convincing. He said:
In effect, this would mean that Congress' purpose was positively to promote the sale
of Indian allotments to non-Indians. Such a purpose is wholly inconsistent with the
provisions for holding allotments in trust for twenty-five years. The initial trust
status of allotments indicates a purpose to encourage the retention of Indian ownership.... The idea was to prevent non-Indians from gobbling up the land which had
been given to Indians ....
Id. at 117.
46. Id. at 116.
47. Comment, The Water Rights of K lmath Indian Allottees, 59 OREGON L. REV. 299, 323
(1980). However, the sale of all the Indian allotee's land to the non-Indian, under this sug-

gestion, would be inconsistent with the purposes of the reservation. Id.
48. Dufford, supra note 45, at 116. Under this suggestion, the transfer of all of the Indian

allottee's land could be consistent with the reservation's purposes.
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was an attempt by so-called "friends of the Indian" to
assimilate the Indians into the civilized American society. 49
However, one opponent of this Act, Senator Teller of Colorado, recognized the strong desire by the Indians to retain
their cultural heritage. Senator Teller "recognized the inherent objection of the Indian mind to land in severalty.... He
knew that it was part of the Indian's religion not to divide their
land. ..."50
The federal government, with the enactment of the Indian
Reorganization Act of 1934,51 adopted the policy towards Indians of cultural survival instead of cultural destruction. 52 This
Act gave Indians new opportunities including Indian selfgovernment and conservation of Indian lands and resources. 3
Even though the Colvilles did not reorganize under this Act, 54
it is apparent from their adamant contentions in Colville that
they continue to adhere to the existence of one tribal nation. 55
The ability of an individual Indian allottee to transfer reserved
water rights to a non-Indian would seem to counter Indian
cultural values.
The benefit to an individual allottee is apparent. His ability
to transfer reserved water rights appurtenant to his land
would greatly increase the value of the land. However, this individual benefit would be detrimental to the tribe as a whole by
decreasing the amount of water reserved for the benefit of the
entire tribe. Furthermore, the transferability of such a
valuable water right could cause opportunists to exert added
pressure upon the allottee to sell his land. This may lead to an
increase in the frequency of transfers of allotted lands by Indian allottees and, thus, a break up of reservation lands. The
ultimate result may be a dissolution of the tribe as one nation.
A restriction on the transferability of reserved water
rights may deter an Indian allottee from transferring his land
at all. If the valuable reserved water right is not transferable
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

MAXFIELD, supra note 5, at 29.
Id. at 30.
25 U.S.C. SS 461-492 (1976). See note 5 supra.
MAXFIELD, supra note 5, at 30.
Id. at 34.
See note 5 supra.
The Tribe sought to enjoin Walton from interfering with tribal use of tribal reserved
waters. Colville Confederated Tribes %-.%
ooi,r,
up-. nwte 4. at 1323'. 1325-
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with the land, it would be less economically beneficial to the
Indian to sell the land or to the non-Indian to buy it. Consequently, there would be less pressure put on the Indian to sell
his land. The tribe's interests, therefore, would be served by
keeping the land and the reserved water rights in Indian
ownership.
Diminution of Indian Rights
The Colville court, in holding that the restriction on
transferability of reserved water rights is a "diminution of Indian rights", relied upon Bryan v. ItascaCounty"6 and Mattz v.
Arnett. 57 However, these two Supreme Court decisions are
distinguishable from the Colville case. The Bryan Court was
faced with the question of whether state tax laws were applicable to an Indian within a reservation absent express Congressional intent to do so.58 The Court in Mattz was presented
with the question of whether the opening of the reservation
land to allotment was a termination of the reservation absent
express Congressional language. 59 The Courts in Bryan and
Mattz, therefore, were concerned with the diminution of rights
that Indians possessed.
In Colville, however, the court applied this "diminution
rule" to a right that the Indian allottee does not possess, i.e.,
the right to transfer the "full amount" of his reserved water
rights in such a manner that defeats the purpose of their reservation. As noted above, the ability of an Indian to transfer his
reserved water rights seems limited to fulfilling the purposes
for reservation creation. Therefore, absent this fulfillment, the
Indian allottee should not possess a right that is susceptible to
diminution.
The Powers Decision
Walton argued that, in Powers, there would have been
grounds for an injunction if an Indian allottee could not
transfer his reserved water right to the non-Indian
purchaser.60 Therefore, Walton contended that Powers holds
that an Indian allottee can transfer those reserved water
56. See note 31 supra [hereinafter cited in text as Bryan].
57. See note 31 supra [Hereinafter cited in text as Mattz].

58. Bryan v. Itasca County, supra note 31, at 390.
59. Mattz v. Arnett, supra note 31, at 505.

60. Colville Confederated Tribes v. Walton, supra note 13, at 50 n.13.
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rights. 6' In addition, some courts and scholars have interpreted the Supreme Court's decision in Powers to say that the
2
transfer carries with it the appurtenant water rights.6
However, a clear reading of the language in Powers
reveals only that there can be a transfer of some rights. But the
Court did not consider the question of whether the non-Indian
purchasers were entitled to reserved rights nor did it address
the question regarding the amount of water to which they
were entitled. 63 The Powers decision, thus, is not directly on
point and therefore not conclusive on the transferability issue.
The Nature of the Right Acquired by Non-Indian Purchasers
In Colville, as noted earlier, the Court of Appeals determined that the Indian allottee can transfer his "full" reserved
water right to the non-Indian purchaser. 64 The court considered three aspects of the allottee's reserved right to reach
this conclusion.
First, the court reasoned that, because the non-Indian purchaser is unable to acquire more extensive reserved rights
than the Indian seller and the Indian's right is based on the
number of irrigable acres he owns, then, the non-Indian's right
is determined by the number of irrigable acres he owns. 65 The
Indian allottee is, in fact, entitled to a just share of the reserved water rights at the time of the allotment of land. 66 As noted
above, the Supreme Court has recognized "practicable irrigable acreage" as the best way to determine the amount of
water reserved when the purpose of the reservation was to
transform the Indians into an agrarian society. 67 Therefore,
the allottee would be entitled to a just share of that total reser61. Id.
62. See cases cited note 22 supra; Palma, Consideration and Conclusions Concerning the
Transferability qf hdian Water Rights, 20 NAT. RESOURCES L. J. 91, 96 (1980);
Trelease, supra note 24, at 222, 231; Leaphart, Sale and Lease of Indian Water Rights,
33 MoNT. L. REv. 266, 269-70 (1972); Veeder, Indian Prior Rights to Use of Water. 16
ROCKY MTN. L. INST. 631, 657 (1971).
63. See text accompanying note 21 supra; Dufford, supra note 45, at 112-13 n.62.
64. Colville Confederated Tribes v Walton, supra note 13, at 51.
65. Id. See text accompanying note 36 supra.
66. See Scholder v. United States, 428 F.2d 1123, 1126 (9th Cir. 1970); Sequendo v. United
States, 123 F. Supp. 554, 558 (S.D. Cal. 1954). See generally Trelease, supro note 24, at
231.
67. See text accompanying note 26 supra. Even though the Supreme Court in Cappaertand
New Mexico allowed the reservation of water rights for purposes of the reservation other
than irrigation, that water (for spawning and a fishery in Colville) should not be part of
the Indian allottee's reserve here.
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vation amount determined by his proportionate share of the
68
watershed.
However, the total just share of the allottee's reserved
rights should not be alienable to the non-Indian purchaser. The
transfer of this right, as noted before, would not meet the purposes of the reservation's establishment. The district court in
Colville concluded, therefore, that because this transfer
defeats the purpose for the implied reservation of water, that
right is completely lost. 69 This conclusion was reinforced by

the Supreme Court in Montana v. United States70 when the
Court said, "treaty rights with respect to reservation lands
must be read in light of the subsequent alienation of those
lands." 7 That conclusion, however, would be inconsistent with
the advancement of tribal interests. The most just result would
water right not used by
be to allow the amount of the reserved
72
tribe.
the
to
revert
to
the allottee
Assuming that the reserved right has not been quantified
(as in Colville), the tribe may receive more water than is
necessary to fulfill the purposes for which the remaining land
was reserved. This reveals one problem with basing quantification on "practicably irrigable acreage." However, it would be
reasonable to allow the tribe a change of use of the water they
received. The tribe should be able to use this water for present
needs other than agriculture or fishing. The Court in Arizona
seemed to permit this when it affirmed the Special Master's
ruling in which he said, "the United States asks only for
enough water to satisfy future agricultural and related uses.
This does not necessarily mean, however, that water reserved
for Indian reservations may not be used for purposes other
than agriculture and related uses . . .,73
68. The Colville court refers to this amount as "ratable share." Colville Confederated Tribes
v. Walton, supra note 13, at 51.

69. Colville Confederated Tribes v. Walton, supra note 4, at 1329.
U.S.
-,
101 S. Ct. 1245 (1981). In Montana, the dispute was between the
70. __
United States, as fiduciary for the Crow Tribe, and the State of Montana. The United
States sought a declaratory judgment quieting title to the bed of the Big Horn River in
the United States as the Tribe's trustee. In addition, the United States sought a declara.
tion that the United States and the Tribe possessed sole authority to regulate hunting and
fishing on all lands within the reservation including lands owned by non-Indians.

71. Id. at 1256 (interpreting Puyallup Tribe v. Washington Game Department, 433 U.S. 165,
174 (1977)).
72. Cf. Dufford, supra note 45, at 114 n.63. (Dufford feels that the full reserved right, including the amount appropriated by the allottee at the time of transfer, should revert to

the tribe).
73. Rifkind, Report of Special Master, Arizona v. California 265 (1960). See, e.g., Trelease,
supra note 24, at 225.
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Secondly, the Colville court held that the non-Indian purchaser should acquire the same priority date as the Indian
allottee held. 74 Applying this holding, Walton would have a
priority as of the date the reservation was created, July 2,
1872. But this ability of the non-Indian purchaser to receive
the Indian's priority date is unjust to other non-Indians. Even
though his actual use could be created after a competing state
water user's, he could become a senior appropriator.7 5 Such a
benefit to the non-Indian purchaser would undercut the prior
appropriation system. Thus, it would seem that there is no
justification for reversing priorities between non-Indians.7 6
Furthermore, such a benefit to the non-Indian would not serve
to advance tribal interests. A water right reserved specifically
for the Colville Reservation that is acquired by a non-Indian
with a date-of-reservation priority date can only be detrimental to the cultural survival of the Tribe. As noted earlier,
because of added pressure put on the allottee to sell this
valuable land, there would be an increased frequency of such
transfers which would result in the dissolution of reservation
lands and, possibly, the tribe as one nation.
Even though the deprivation of a water user's priority is a
deprivation of a valuable water right, 77 the inequity, to the
tribe and non-Indians alike, of the priority reversal in this instance should not be allowed. It would be more equitable to
give the non-Indian what another state or private appropriator
would take. Consequently, the priority date for rights acquired
by the non-Indian purchaser should be the date of actual appropriation of water for irrigation by the Indian allottee.7 8
Finally, the Colville court determined that Walton acquired a right to water currently appropriated by the Indian
allottee at the time of the conveyance.7 9 Furthermore, Walton
acquired a right, with a date-of-reservation priority date, to
water that he appropriates with reasonable diligence after the
74. Colville Confederated Tribes v. Walton, supra note 13, at 51. See text accompanying note
36 supra.
75. Dufford, supra note 45, at 116 n.68. This is because by the special nature of a reserved
right it is almost always "senior." See note 30 supra.
76. Dufford, supra note 45, at 116 n.68.
77. Colville Confederated Tribes v. Walton, supra note 13, at 51; Veeder, supro note 62, at

662 (citing Nichols v. McIntosh, 19 Colo. 22, 34 P. 278:280 (1893)).
78. See Colville Confederated Tribes v. Walton, supra note 4, at 1329.
79. Colville Confederated Tribes v. Walton, supra note 13, at 51. See text accompanying note
36 supra.
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conveyance. 8 0 Walton should have the right to irrigate the
thirty-two acres under irrigation at the time he acquired his
land. But this should not be a reserved right, as noted before,
but simply a right he acquires through prior appropriation.
Likewise, the amount of water appropriated with reasonable
diligence by the non-Indian should not be considered a reserved right, but a right acquired through prior appropriation. 8 1
This appropriation with reasonable diligence would have a
priority date as of the date the non-Indian establishes use.
The Direction the United States Supreme Court Should Take
The New Mexico decision should give some guidance when
predicting the Court's direction on this transferability issue.
As noted before, the New Mexico analysis should apply to all
federal enclaves, including Indian reservations. 82 Therefore, it
would seem evident that the transferability of Indian's reserved water rights to non-Indian purchasers would almost always
fail to meet the purposes of the reservation.
Furthermore, the New Mexico Court stated in dictum that:
When ... a river is fully appropriated, federally reserved water rights will frequently require a gallon-forgallon reduction in the amount of water available for
water-needy state and private appropriators. This reality has not escaped the attention of Congress and must
Congress
be weighed in determining what, if any, water
83
reserved for use on the national forests.
This language indicates a concern by the majority for the
needs of private and state appropriators in the arid Western
United States. This concern of the Supreme Court should
direct it towards the position taken by the district court in Colville. The transferability of Winters doctrine rights from an Indian allottee to a non-Indian purchaser would result in inequities to other non-Indians that the Court seems to have a
desire to avoid.8 4 In addition to this concern, the Court should
80. Id.
81. Throughout the history of the prior appropriation doctrine there has existed a general

principle "that the validity of an appropriation of water as against intervening rights
depends upon its being completed within reasonable time with the exercise of due
diligence."

HUTCHINS, I WATER RIGHTS LAWS IN THE NINETEEN WESTERN UN[TED

STATES 373 (1971).
82. See note 29 supra.
83. United States v. New Mexico, supra note 27, at 705.
84. See note 30 supra.
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also "weigh" the resulting detriment to the Colville tribal
members.
CONCLUSION

The court in Colville allowed the Indian allottee to transfer
his "full" amount of reserved water rights to the non-Indian
purchaser in what would appear to be a contravention of the
principles established in Winters and its progeny. The court
based its decision upon a distinguishable general rule controlling the diminution of Indian rights and a Congressional Act
subsequent to the executive order establishing the "primary
purposes" of the Colville Reservation. Based upon established
law, the transferability of these rights should be limited to
situations that would continue to fulfill the purposes of the
reservation.
Furthermore, a balancing of the equities would show that,
even though the Indian allottee and the non-Indian purchaser
would benefit, the adverse effects would be felt by the tribe
and the non-Indian appropriators. Because the water was impliedly reserved to fulfill the purposes of the reservation,
substantial consideration should be given to the interests of
the tribe.
JOHN F. ARAAS

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol17/iss1/6

14

